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Perfortnativity, Regulative
Fictions, Huge Stabilities:
FRAMING BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME
Terry Threadgold
Iwant in this paper to explore the stories that proliferate around the livednarrative realities of women who kill violent husbands. I will even tellsome more stories but I do this in the knowledge that not just any sto-
ries will do. As Graycar (1996) has argued there are very real limits to the
perfonnative power of feminist narratives if they fail to engage with the
huge stabilities, legal discipline, categories doctrines and, I would add,
practices, that they are attempting to change.
In other words, it will be suggested that while it is essential that alternative
stories, in particular the stories of the powerless be told, this approach is
itself constrained by the limits imposed by the legal categories within
which we understand legal problems and hear the telling of legal stories.
This discussion then is concerned with the ways in which legal categories
help to shape legal problems, and in the case of violence against women~
help to obscure the reality of many women's lives. (1996:80)
At the same time I want to explore some of the theoretical stories emerg-
ing from recent feminist theorising which may in their tum begin to trace
the intertextual histories of legal categories. For the law also tells stories,
not least important of which for this paper would have to be the narratives
associated with universal justice and the reasonable man.
The metaphor of gender as the compulsory performance of heterosexuali-
ty - a metaphor taken from Judith Butler's work (1993) w helps to fore-
ground these questions insofar as it 'brings into relief ... the understated,
taken-far-granted quality of heterosexual performativity' (Butler
1993:235). Butler's concept of performativity is derived from some com-
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plex and difficult theoretical positions:
Althusser's concept of interpellation ('paradoxically, the discur-
sive condition of social recognition precedes and conditions the
fonnation of the subject' (Butler 1993:226);
Foucaulfs argument that discourse produces (rather than repre-
senting) the things of which it speaks ('the power of discourse to
produce that which it names' (Butler 1993:225»;
Austin's concept of the performative speech act as used in
Sedgwick in her work on queer performativity (whereby what is
spoken performs what it speaks: "'I pronounce you ...H puts into
effect the relation that it names' (Butler 1993:224»;
Derrida's understandings of the perfonnative and of iterability or
citation ('''Could a perfonnative succeed", Asks Derrida, "if its
fannulation did not repeat a ~coded' or iterable utterance?"
(Butler 1993:226).
Butler's work operates in the culturally specific context of psychoanalytic
feminism and queer theory, asking how it is that the compulsory repetiti-
tion (citation) that is gender may at the same time proliferate different, sub-
versive performances of the self:
If the regulatory fictions of sex and gender are themselves multi-
ply contested sites of meaning, then the very multiplicity of their
construction holds out the possibility of a disruption of their uni-
vocal posturing. (1990:32)
The issue for Butler in the end though is not just the proliferation of per-
formances of the self produced within the constraints of power, unregulat-
ed by its fictions. It is the attempt to use them, agentively, subversively:
'Performativity describes this relation of being implicated in that which
one opposes, this turning of power against itself to produce alternative
modalities of power, ..." (Butler 1993:241). But subversion depends on cul-
tural intelligibility:
Cultural configurations of sex and gender might then proliferate
or, rather, their present proliferation might then become articula-
ble within the discourses that establish intelligible cultural life,
confounding the very binarism of sex, and exposing its funda-
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mental unnaturalness. (1990:149)
Butler's doctrinal categories, derived from psychoanalytic feminisms and
the combination of poststructuralism, deconstruction and specific theories
of signification provide useful metaphors of resistance which are (like
Marcus's below) never sufficiently located institutionally, socially, cultur-
ally. They lack the contextual complexity of materialist semiotic under-
standings of, for example, the ~cinematic' (Heath and de Lauretis 1980) the
legal apparatus (Frow 1995). I have the same anxieties as Graycar about
the telling of feminist stories, or performing the self differently) as if that
in itself were a sufficient agenda for change. And yet I remain interested in
the way particular performances of selves are constrained and organised.
At the same time I believe that the luxury of proliferating sexualities and
identities may well serve to further obscure the realities of the lives of
women with lesser cultural and symbolic capital. So I want to ask how
much change in the embodied self, how many ~modes of becoming, modes
of transfonnation' (Grosz 1994:210) does the system actually produce as
its excess (power producing its others) and how much of what is produced
is rather a despe,rate response to social and cultural forces neither under-
stood nor theorised? In the case of women who kill the stories that are told
of and by them are often profoundly gendered. Biology is in some sense
the ~cause". With Butler then I want to ask: ~What kind of performance
might reveal this ostensible "cause~' to be an effect of sedimented history?'
(1990: 139). That is the question I want to pose in this paper looking at
women who kill their husbands, but also at the husbands who, in some
sense, had to be killed.
PERFORMANCE AND PERFORMATIVIIT
The courtroom, which Graycar's intervention does not directly address, is
also a place of perfonnance. And whatever else the consequences of killing
a male spouse may be, unrehearsed performance in a courtroom where the
other players know the script, the spatial organisation, the rules of the game
(kinesics~proxemics) and have performed the adversarial encounter before
- is almost inevitable. The one person who does not know the 'code' and
for whom therefore the courtroom performatives/performance cannot be
~successful' because for her it cannot be meaningful iteration or citation,
indeed is neither of these things at all, is the female complainant in a rape
or sexual assault trial or the defendant if it is a spousal murder trial.!
Rather more like Eco's (1976) undercoder, she has no code and therefore
must hypothesise, abduct the meaning of what goes on around her~ indeed
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of what is targeted at her. At the same time she is given no time for this
reflective activity, but is expected to improvise. The only time in the mur-
der proceedings when she may expect to have some insider knowledge is
when the defence is leading its case, but here of course because of the rules
of this particular adversarial game anything she says or does is immediate-
ly suspect and open to cross-examination where she will and can have no
pre-rehearsed idea of the rules. At the same time, every speech act in this
context perfonnatively reproduces (or violates) in some version, the rape,
the assault, the abuse which is her story. (Matoesian 1993).
In the space of the courtroom her lack of semiotic and performative exper-
tise risks being read with a degree of cultural ethnocentrism as 'a lack, ...
primitive, underdeveloped' (Bal: 1992:7). If we look at this from a differ-
ent perspective we can see that she is also the phenomenon that has to be
decoded. In her story, they the ones who are unrehearsed. Bal (1992:7) in
fact quotes a passage from Eco in which he describes the position of the
one who does not know the code and is forced to undercode:
Even if we do not know the socialised meanings of those gestures
we can at any rate recognise the gesturer as Italian, Jew, Anglo-
Saxon and so ont just as almost everybody is able to recognise a
Chinese or a German speaker as such even if he does not speak.
Chinese or Gennan. These behaviours are able to signify even
though the sender does not attribute such a capacity to them. (Eco
1976:18)
Bal (1990:7) rightly points out that what Eco has provided above, despite
himself, is 'a semiotic description of racism, and of other practices of dis-
crimination, like ethnocentrism and sexism.' It is worth quoting her in full
here:
It is the ever-widening gap between the intention of the sender,
who is not, in principle, concerned with his/her own identity as
other, and the insufficient knowledge from which the interpreter
of the sender's code suffers t that creates the void in which the
racist code can implant itself. The example demonstrates in fact
to what extent codes are necessarily correlative: meaning comes
to occupy all empty space, emptiness being the most frightening
sign of what is different, and ignorance of code cancels all signi-
fications, save that which is already known by the interpreter.
(Bat 1990:7)
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This it seems to me is precisely what always happens in courtrooms when
the stories women tell do not indeed fit the legal categories, cannot be
made sense of in those terms. The space left empty by this lack of correla-
tion of codes indeed cancels all meanings other than the stereotypical sto-
ries the interpreter already knows (Graycar 1996 gives several useful
examples).
We begin here I think to see just how complex, performatively, the court-
room context where a woman has killed the man to whom she needs to be
appended to gain ethical treatment (Gatens 1996), must be. A performative
moreover is an authoritative utterance, one which is located in the materi-
ality of institutions, codes, interests and the corporeality ofpower relations.
If you are not so located, if the institution and its categories exclude you,
your perfonnance can never have the power either of iterability or of per-
fonnativity except within the frameworks of the stereotypes that rush to fill
the semiotic void of your exclusion. There you may well be read as a cita-
tion of a story you were never in, heard as performatively enacting realities
you never knew, written as other by men whose categories cannot contain
you.
You are Desdemona to a murdering Othello, a man who is convinced of
your guilt and who keeps demanding: 'Are you not a whore?', 'Are you not
a strumpet?', declaring:' Dh thou black weed, wouldst thou hadst ne'er
been born'. Othello is a play about many of the issues I want to address
here - the jealous, insecure, 'battering' husband, the loving, empathetic and
responsive wife who is written and silenced by men, the misogyny of Iago.
the very old binary tropes of praise and blame which structure the stereo-
typical stories of femininity in the play. The play makes use of many of the
narrative scripts I will deal with below and it has been used as literary evi-
dence to develop the defence of provocation in the case of spousal murder
by a husband (Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610). We might well
want to ask what kind of sedimented history produces this perfonnance.
RAPE, NARRATIVE AND SOCIAL CHANGE?
Sharon Marcus has argued (1992) forcefully against the consistent way in
which she sees women being positioned and positioning themselves as
'victim' in what she calls 'the rape script'. It is crucial she says to treat rape
as linguistic because if it is merely a script, then it is subject to change:
Another way to refuse to recognise rape as the real fact of our
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lives is to treat it as a linguistic fact: to ask how the violence of
rape is enabled by narratives, complexes and institutions which
derive strength not from outright, immutable, unbeatable force
but rather from their power to structure our lives as imposing cul-
tural scripts. To understand rape in this way is to understand it as
subject to change. (Marcus 1992: 388-89)
By script she argues that she means narrative, a gendered grammar of vio-
lence (392). Her argument is that this script predisposes women~ especial-
ly if they know the rapist, to counter masculine verbal and physical aggres-
sion with non-combative responses, what she calls 'self-deprecating
notions of polite feminine speech'. In this gendered grammar (narrative) of
violence, women's resistance is condemned and unthinkable. Women must
be the objects of violence and the subjects of fear. It is certainly true that
this is the script that Shakespeare's Desdemona performatively enacts. Her
loving response, her refusal to take offence, does allow him to set the lim-
its to her discourse. Certainly she is the subject of fear and the object of
murder. Marcus then argues that women must rewrite their will, their
agency and their capacity for violence.Like Butler she argues that the
social construction of gender does not preclude new perfonnances of the
self. In tenns reminiscent of Gatens (1996) she argues that rape, as script,
engenders a female body excluded from the right to engage in a fair fight.
Women's 'rapability' is she argues related to their legal position as 'prop-
erty' exchanged in marriage, unable to enter contracts. This legal position
makes it both implausible that women will resist attempts at appropriation
and logical that their bodies be regarded as violable, penetrable. Her final
proposal is that women take seriously the temporality of male sexuality, the
fragility of the erection, the vulnerability of male genitalia - and frighten
rape culture to death!
Nina Puren (1995) has already pointed to part of the problem with these
arguments by demonstrating that the typical rape trial scenario immediate-
ly tells a very different story. It is probably also arguable that those women
who appear in court as complainants in rape trials, given the far larger
numbers of raped women who do not proceed to that point, are already not
positioning themselves as 'victim' but as someone with the right to bring
charges, to speak, to refuse the violence that has been done to them (Heath
and Naffme 1994). Puren (1995) has argued that in the courtroom the
woman who claims complainant status ( I prefer not to say that she sees
herself as 'victim' although she may) is liable to find herself relocated by
the court in a different rape script where she is the grammatical medium of
the action - its cause or agent (Halliday 1985) - and the rapist is rewritten
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as the target or recipient of her actions. Translated, this means that she is
construed as 'rapable', deserving it, provoking it, wanting it, telling lies
about it. She not he is the cause or agent of events until proven otherwise.
He (in this version) is immensely vulnerable and pliable, subject to the
whims of any temptress or perhaps to uncontrollable nature. In the light of
this, Marcus's reading of the rape script seems something of an oversim-
plification. There is clearly more than one script. In a hostile adversarial
context, to suggest that women rewrite the script, when there others over
which they have no subversive control whatsoever, seems a more prob-
lematic task and one that must give us cause to reflect again on Graycar's
point about legal categories and on Butler's understanding of performativ-
ity.
This then is where I will finally tum to the spousal murder cases I want to
discuss because in effect what happens in these cases (at least in one read-
ing) is that women do indeed 'rewrite their capacity for violence' and
become the agent of their own defence. They perfonn themselves differ-
ently and perfonnatively just as Marcus recommends. Unfortunately this
story of agency and self-defence is then transformed by legal categories
until the idea that there might have been violent and prolonged provocation
to kill is written out.
DOMESTIC PAIN/PUBLIC STORIES
Only a very small number of battered women actually kill their abusers
(Mahoney 1991-1992). In all the studies that have been done on the ques-
tion of homicide men appear responsible for 85-87% of all homicides com-
mitted, with women committing the relatively small remainder of crimes
(Wallace 1986, Bonney 1988, Strang 1991). The proportion of male killers
is even higher when murder/suicides are taken into account (Wallace
1986).. Homicide occurs predominantly in a domestic context. It appears,
in that context, to be a gendered crime in that while women mostly kill to
\ avoid hann for themselves or others, men kill in an attempt to exercise
.' power or control over their spouse. Many women are killed by their spous-
es as a result of separation, attempts to leave, even threats to leave.
(Mahoney 1991-1992; Wallace 1986; Stubbs 1994).
Despite all these statistics and the very clear story they tell about mas-
culinity, when women kill a violent spouse their legal advisers are still (in
1996) at pains to prove that she killed in self-defence. While a number of
legal defences and case precedents are beginning to provide alternative
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defences and a higher likelihood of a verdict of manslaughter than murder2
there is no certainty as yet in any of this for the woman who kills. The alter-
native is Battered Woman's Syndrome (Walker 1979,1984,1989) Of, more
recently, the hostageltorture narrative of Stockholm Syndrome (Graham,
Rawlings and Rigsby 1994).
Lenore Walker's feminist work on Battered Woman's Syndrome was
designed to contest the narrative that battered women are masochistic,
enjoy the violence or feel they deserve it, that they go looking for abusive
men and that they bring the abuse on themselves ( a narrative that is per-
formatively enacted still in many cross-examinations in courtrooms where
these women come to trial). The actual definition of the proposed syn-
drome is difficult to tie down, vacillating between her theories of learned
helplessness, the cycle of violence and post-traumatic stress disorder. It is
it seems somewhat ironic that the script/narrative that legal personages and
legal doctrine can accommodate is one that to some extent matches the
stereotypical view of women in many of their own existing scripts and nar-
ratives. This is a woman who is a victim, who is very clearly not an agent
of her own self-defence.3 It is also of course a script that comes with
authority, with evidence - the (usually male) expert medical or psycholog-
ical witness. In a very real sense the performative authority of the expert
witness is what produces Battered Woman's Syndrome as a reality, enacts
it as a scientifically valid reason for killing - and thus also produces the ver-
dict of manslaughter or something even less. Pragmatically then, in tenns
of matching the law's categories with a version of the woman's experience
and producing a successful result for her, many feminist lawyers see this as
a viable and useful defence although many of them do not seem to believe
Walker's story (Brown 1996).4
Much more recently the hostage has become a possible character in this
bevy of narratives. The tenn Stockholm Syndrome was coined in 1973 to
describe the puzzlingly protective and later loving reactions of four bank
employees to their captors (Graham, Rawlings and Rigsby 1994). Those
who developed the idea of the 'syndrome' in this case described what hap-
pened as a strategy of loving to survive under conditions of captivity, a
'love addiction'. So while these women are written as having strategies
they also end up with an 'addiction'. Easteal (1996) uses this work to
rewrite the story (without the addiction or the love), of Marie Whalen a
Woman who was sent to prison for five years for killing her husband.
Easteal shows how the same evidence that was used at her trial can be used
to write a hostage story with a different ending. When the caged lady in
Easteal's story kills her captor with a knife and an axe while he is drunk,
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she is applauded for her action. 'She has killed a 'bad' man' (Easteal
1996:15).
The idea that the battered wife has been the victim of torture, a captive, a
hostage in her own home is, it seems, also a potentially useful basis for a
different kind of self-defence argument. What is amazing however, given
the statistics above, and the number of domestic murder/suicides involving
the taking hostage of women and children in their own homes, is that it
took a public, media event to set the 'experts' to work looking for more
syndromes. The hostage narrative as currently constituted risks deflecting
attention fr~m the 'captor' (it is she who has the addiction) and from the
utter normality of violence within the marital home or domestic space. As
Easteal shows, there is a perfectly comprehensible hostage story in which
the woman is not, again, reduced to taking erotic pleasure in her captivity
or abuse. The taking of hostages must be seen as criminal behaviour with-
in domestic as well as public space - not written as unusual, a public and
rare kind of crisis.
HALLUCINATIONS OF THE COMMON lAW
Margaret Raby's trial in late 1994 was the first time a defence of Battered
Woman's Syndrome (BWS) as a partial defence of provocation was used
in Victoria. The nature of provocation as a 'male model of behaviour'
(requiring 'sudden' provocation to an immediate, violent act of 'uncon-
trollable' male passion) was recognised in this courtroom and there were
discussions of those gendered issues. Margaret Raby was convicted by
Justice Teague and a jury of twelve of killing her husband (after eleven
weeks of marriage) on 20/10/1994 and given a mitigated sentence of 28
months with a non-parole period of seven months. Having spent six months
in remand, she probably had little time left to serve. The consequences of
the use of the defence of BWS, of its recognition as a legally valid catego-
ry, can I think be seen in the words of Justice Teague's judgement with its
concomitant amazing ability not to hear what it itself has to say about mas-
culinity and torture, or to recognise that abnonnality might be normal in
such a context as the first paragraph below describes:
Keith Raby ... was almost continuously adversely affected by
alcohol and drugs, and ... he effectively imprisoned you and then
brainwashed you physically, psychologically and sexually.
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.... you were not acting normally. Among the less graphic descrip-
tions of you were 'dissociated', 'not with it', 'detached'. In my
view that abnormal state although assessed by Dr. Bartholomew
as falling short of automatism, is a key factor in my ultimate
assessment as to how you should be punished.
There is no message here that the conduct of the deceased was
such that he was getting his just deserts. Nor is there any message
that any other women in a similar fonn of subjugation ought to be
encourages to think that to resort to self-help through violence is
to be condoned. Disposing of battering men is absolutely unac-
ceptable. Exposing them for the villains that they are is to be
encouraged in every way. (The (Underlining is my own)(R v.
Raby (Unreported, 22nd. November 1994, Supreme Court of
Victoria, No. 94, Teague, J., 1, 2))
Justice Teague can excuse Margaret Raby's conduct only if her story is
rewritten by another man, an expert witness, as 'not normal'. Like
Desdemona's her guilt and her innocence are (can only be) written by men.
Therese McCarthy has commented that: 'The fact that "expert" testimony
is required to understand the effects of a crime which is second only to traf-
fic offences in tenus of police workload is extraordinary.' (1995:145).5
It is even more extraordinary, and the more obviously a gendered response,
when one realises that on the same day as Margaret Raby was convicted of
manslaughter, another judge in Melbourne, Judge Robert Cahill, was work-
ing on another provocation trial. He told the court he understood why a
man called Peacock had killed his wife (after he discovered she was hav-
ing an affair) and said that he was reluctant to jail him at all, declaring: 'I
seriously wonder how many men married four or five years would have the
strength to walk away without inflicting some form of corporal punish-
ment' (The Herald Sun, 20 October 1994). This is evidence of a systemat-
ically gendered difference in the way homicide is treated in our court-
rooms, not a one-off example (Greenwood 1996), and there are sediment-
ed historical reasons for this. Kate Hay (1995) has pointed out that the case
which is often cited as the case that overhauled the law of provocation (The
Queen v R (1981) 28 S.A.S.R. 321) in fact relies on 'quite arcane legal
precedents' (1995:13), and she quotes precedents from as far back as 1871,
1946, 1963 to prove her point. King, C.J. delivered the leading judgment
in this case, telling us what provocation is in a 'well-ordered and civil soci-
ety'. It is not 'hatred, resentment, fear or revenge' (325). It is 'conduct
which might cause an ordinary person to lose his self-control to such an
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extent as to perpetrate the violent act which has resulted in the death' (327).
King, C.J. provides an example:
In times when the criterion of provocation were expressed in
tenns directed to duels and personal quarrels among men who
ordinarily bear anus or to violence produced by violence.... The
modem cases are however not for the most part concerned with
clashes between anned men, but with provocative conduct of a
very different type, very often consisting of matrimonial infideli-
ty. (327) (My underlining)
Thus the legal categories of provocation and self defence appear to be thor-
oughly embedded in a sedimented narrative history:
The institution hallucinates standard fonus of procedure and
nonns of usual behaviour on the strength of half remembered
arguments, through the dazed recollection of unreported cases or
largely forgott~n conversations. (Goodrich and Hachamovitch
1991:174)
In the light of these excursions into the words and wit of judges it does
seem to me that it is time Othello stopped being narrativised as a hero, time
he became the grammatical medium in such cases, not she, time we start-
ed to ask just who it is who has lost his faculties in these courtrooms.
The Raby transcript reminded me narratively of the Robyn Bella Kina case
and of a book called Lifers (1987) written by eleven women doing life for
spousal murder in Canada. Since that time Greenwood's The Thing She
Loves (1996) has produced further evidence that the story these women try
to tell is a very common one, indeed frighteningly nonnal. Elsewhere
(Threadgold 1997 forthcoming) I have attempted to trace the details of that
story in its textually and intertextually mediated forms. Here I want to
, focus on some legal responses to it.
Robyn Bella Kina is an Aboriginal woman who was convicted of killing
her partner Tony Black, a white man who had had several previous rela-
tionships with Aboriginal women. She served six years in prison after
being convicted of murder before she was the subject of a petition for par-
don to the governor of Queensland and a reference to the Court of Appeal
from Queensland Attorney-General, Dean Wells. The Court of Appeal set
aside her conviction in late 1993, and ruled that justice had miscarried at
her trial. The grounds on which this decision was made were her
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Aboriginality which, it was said, had lead to miscommunications in the
earlier trial proceedings, and BWS. It is important here to understand that
Kina was advised by her legal representatives (the Public Defender and the
Aboriginal Legal Service) not to give evidence at her fIrst trial and that the
defence on that occasion did not present any evidence of the violent abuse
she had been subjected to at the hands of Tony Black. In the transcript of
the Court of Appeal judgments it is argued that Robyn, because she was
Aboriginal, had difficulty communicating what had happened to her to
those defending her. She appears to have allowed her legal representatives
to decide for her that she should not give evidence in her own defence.
Nevertheless, she found for herself, through another prisoner, and contact-
ed, a social worker, David Berry, to whom she was able to speak. His report
and his attempts to speak to her legal advisers all seem to have fallen on
deaf ears in the period leading up to the first trial. His evidence was not in
fact finally heard until the Court of Appeal. Dr. Diana Eades who gave lin-
guistic evidence before the Court of Appeal argued that Robyn's initial
inability to communicate was typically Aboriginal but that in prison she
had learned how to communicate in a non-Aboriginal way so that she could
later reveal what had happened to her.6 This may have been strategically
useful evidence on Eades part, but outside the courtroom, none of this
explains why all along she was able to communicate perfectly well with
Berry and later with a series of journalists who brought her case before the
public eye. In 1991, David Goldie and Amanda Groom interviewed her for
an ABC-TV documentary, Without Consent. David May interviewed her
for Good Weekend in 1994 (March 26, 1994).
Berry is reported as saying, of her disclosure to him at their first meeting
of Black's violence: 'It required no particular skills; I just sat there and lis-
tened.' (Good Weekend: 42). In fact there seems to have been a still unac-
knowledged (perhaps benevolent) racism in the legal conviction that
Aboriginals are so uncommunicative that they are better silenced altogeth-
er, and in the still unexplained absence of Berry's and Hamilton's (the
Legal Aid solicitor who wrote a report on some aspects of Black's violence
as told to her by Robyn) reports at the first trial.7 In all of this, except when
David Berry's tells the story, it is Robyn's communicative skills that are
assumed to have been deficient. Interviewed by Good Weekend after her
release from prison she had this to say:
~I don't feel bitter about anything hey,' she says at a riverside
cafe. 'With the lawyers, I guess I couldn't sorta open up to them,
and for some reason they just wouldn't listen to Dave Berry ...
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Lawyers talk in big words. You think: 'I wish they would use
ordinary words.' And then you think: 'Maybe they just don't
know them!' She laughs. 'There are a lot of people in jail who
just don't understand lawyers.' (1994:41)
It is not just feminist stories then that have trouble with legal categories.
There was also a good deal of evidence in Kina's diaries of Black's abu-
sive behaviour - Kina's own story in her own words - which her various
defenders apparently did not think worth using as evidence. Part of the
problem here may well have been that that diary told a story of love and
domestic fiction which could not be read as abuse in terms of the law's
understandings.S For example, Kina's diary recorded that 'he made me
have sex his way' - and no-one thought to ask what that meant. At the
Court of Appeal this was finally decoded as 'forced anal sex'. Although I
do not find mention of it anywhere in the court proceedings Kina's diary
also seems to have contained love letters to 'Tony' (or poems perhaps?)
which 'may have appeared to her defenders to contion her guilt. Thus the
Good Weekend story has at the bottom left hand corner of the first page an
image of a poem taken from the diary titled: 'Paradox: Kina's revealing
poetry' (1994:38). The Poem reads:
Tony
If I could hold you
just a second,
r d hold you just a day.
You'd be in my arms forever
forever and a day
Certainly in the Raby trial similar letters addressed to Keith Raby were
used in evidence against Margaret Raby (Transcript, 384-86). In both
cases, it seems, the co-existence of expressions of love and extreme sexu-
al violence and abuse were read, could be read, as only contradictory 'para-
doxical' signs of guilt. They are never read as coping strategies in intoler-
able situations, attempts to write the self differently in diaries and letters
which the law erroneously reads as 'fact' and 'evidence' despite the his-
torical evidence of the ambiguity between fact and fiction with respect to
precisely these genres that O'Connell's (1992) work demonstrates
(Threadgold 1997 forthcoming; Davis 1983; Armstrong 1987).
It is significant that while both Raby and Kina are described in very simi-
lar tenns, and while both are apparently quite articulate when speaking to
friends and sympathisers, these behaviours are significantly never attrib-
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uted in Raby~s case to her colour, the fact that she is white. With the help
of a woman defence lawyer her 'symptoms' are attributed by the 'experts'
to 'trauma-induced BWS and amnesia' - not you will notice to cultural and
linguistic deficiency. This comparison should tell us something about the
way the perrormativity of the courtroom silences and misreads novice,
unpractised perfonnances in that space or even denies them the right to
participate in the performance at all. Robyn Kina did not even make the
cast! It should also tell us something about the dangers of reading frag-
ments of the performance of the self, the bits that correlate (with difficul-
ty) with your own petfonnance, your own categories/stories as the whole
and all there is to know.
But the law goes on reading partial scripts with considerable equanimity.
The women in my story, Robyn~ Margaret and Susan, do not remember
making the confession that brings them to court. Margaret Raby appeared
on video confessing in the courtroom and could not remember:
You heard yourself saying (on the video) you got the knife and
there was a time lapse and you hesitated and stabbed him?--
I wouldn't have ~ there was no way I would ever hurt Keith.
(Raby transcript, cross-examination, 376)
Susan writes years later of still being unable to recall, of not intending to
kill:
It happened very quickly. One minute I was sitting at the table
rolling cigarettes, and the next minute my husband let out a yell
and he fell out of his chair. Apparently, I'd jumped him, grabbed
a steak knife and stuck it in his heart. He yelled and fell. When he
fell the knife fell out. I remember thinking that r d just nicked
him; I didn't think I'd put the knife in that far.
From now on, the rest of what happened has been reconstructed
from other people's stories ... (My itaIics~ Susan 1987:8)
Robyn describes an act of self defence and protection of a younger niece,
but says she did not mean to kill. Moreover her act is followed by imme-
diate regret, nurturing of the injured man:
I just reached out and stabbed him once in the body. I did not
mean to kill him. I did not mean to injure him seriously. I was not
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aiming for his heart. When I saw that I had stabbed him, I threw
the knife away. He staggered and fell to the ground. I was very
upset.. I said to him that I was sorry and that I loved him and I
also said: HPlease don't die'. I held him in my anns. I asked my
niece Enid to go for an ambulance.
Later on the ambulance came and the police interviewed me. I
was told that he had died. I felt terrible.(My underlining, Kina
transcript Court of Appeal: 13)
What is remarkable about these last two examples is the way, in the telling,
grammatically the women cease to have agency over the events described.
For Susan it is 'apparent' that she has killed her husband. She knows she
wounded him with a knife but had no intent to kill. The same is true of
Kina who is the passive recipient of the news that Black is dead and also
had no apparent intent to kill. In both cases the women were warding off
violent verbal and physical attacks from the men concerned at the time. In
Raby's case Keith Raby had attacked her with a knife the morning of his
death. She was hospitalised but returned home to make it up with him.
Later that evening she killed him. Her story emerges in response to defence
questions at her trial:
You said before that when you first saw him sitting in the chair
you thought that he was dead? - Yes.
By the time you lowered him _to the floor, did you still think he
was dead? - I don't know. I can't remember.
Okay. So you lowered him to the floor and then what happened?
- Then I laid down beside him.
What did you do? - I put my anns round him and I kissed him.
Did he respond?--No.
. So what happened after that? - I just cuddled him.(Raby tran-
script,356-7)
In each of these cases what seems to happen above is that the woman
attempts to write herself out of the scene of death in which she finds her-
self, to write herself back into the story about love and caring that is also
in her letters or her poems. Raby and Kina also attempt to have IVF in
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order to have babies by the men who are both their husbands and their
abusers. This too may a final last ditch attempt to keep the love and mar-
riage story alive, to perform the self differently as a strategy of self
defence. This loving in fact has been a strategy for averting violence for a
very long time. The parallel here between the law as patriarchal structure
and the family as patriarchal structure is startling. The loving which is
strategic in this abusive situation, but so well rehearsed that it has become
a lived reality, is read as the problem in court, the contradiction that proves
guilt, and leads to further abuse in that place. Why has she not left, done
something about it, they ask? The fact that she has just acted finally, that
she has killed to protect herself from the abuse, is somehow as suppressed
as her memories of what she has done. So the reasoning goes: it cannot
really have happened, she is telling lies to protect herself - and we have the
transfonnation of her story of violent abuse into a story the law is more
familiar with, that of the scheming, manipulative and untruthful wife. She
lacks integrity ....
At the same time and quite paradoxically the only way for those who
believe her story to defend her is to argue very firmly that she has not acted
at all, that she has been the object of a syndrome, amnesia, dissociation,
BWS. And while the 'experts' are proving that she has lost her faculties,
the prosecution is intent on proving that she is the medium of her own
abuse:
You knew that they would disapprove of Keith? - Yes.
So that really you went into this, Mrs. Raby, with your eyes wide
open, didn't you? - Not eyes wide open.
Well, you were told by Vanessa that he was an alcoholic and a
violent man and that he would probably alienate your family
because you knew they would disapprove? - Excuse me sir, is
it wrong to want a little bit of happiness? (Raby transcript, p.388)
-- Tell us what he said. I am going to stand here until you
answer? - I am sorry. I apologise for using these words.
Go on? - Can I just use the initials?
Just tell us what he said, that is all we want to know*
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His Honour: If it will make you feel a bit better, I have told many
other people to use words like this in this courtroom---
He called me a fucking cunt.
That is all? Was that all he said? Is that all he says Mrs. Raby?
Were they the only words he said? - I think so. (Raby tran-
script, 367)
Elsewhere (Threadgold 1997 forthcoming) I have tried to trace the sedi-
rnented histories which might explain some of this behaviour (his and hers,
in both the courtroom and the home) in terms of Annstrong's (1987) and
O'Connell's (1992) account of the complex intersections between conduct
books, the rise of the novel as 'domestic fiction', Richardson's Pamela, and
the politics and activism surrounding the passing of the Hardwicke
Marriage Act (1754) in the course of the eighteenth century. I have sug-
gested there that this is the historical apparatus, or one of them, which, in
producing the 'covered' woman who gives up her civil status for affect
when she marries, also produces, effects, the continuum of rape, pornogra-
phy, abuse, torture, love and marriage.9 The Act in its intersections with the
literary performativity of Pamela and domestic fiction, was a very effec-
tive means of controlling the circulation of wealth and women, enacted as
a deliberate policy for changing the performance of femininity, an ethical
apparatus to reshape women's most innennost selves, a grammar of
domesticity, of freedom and slavery. It may also be the apparatus, or part
of it, which produces also the battering man. It seems certainly to be the
apparatus and the script in which the cross-examining barrister in Raby is
permanently stuck. It also looks remarkably like the Marcus rape script dis-
cussed above. Little wonder that there is such confusion in our culture
about the relationship between sex, violence, love, eroticism, pornography
and the Oedipal family story.
THE MISSING STORY: THE BATTERING MAN
Of the many stories I have told above there are several which are as impor-
tant to the production of masculinities as of femininities. The battering
man's story is beginning to be dimly heard and articulated in courtrooms
but his story is still hardly ever related explicitly to the story of the woman
who has killed and is before the law. In the Raby trial one of the expert wit-
nesses did outline his characteristics. Dr. Ken Byrne, a forensic psycholo-
gist, gave evidence of nine types of abuse common in battering relation-
ships (Transcript: 468-171). And listed nine characteristics of the battering
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nan:
1. He has very poor self-esteem which he masks by violent brava-
do and fictional stories of violent encounters.
2. He blames the woman for the abuse and utterly believes that
his perverse behaviour is justified.
3. He believes that men are vastly superior to women.
4. He takes no responsibility for his violent behaviour. He blames
others for causing him to behave in a violent or abusive manner.
5. He is pathologically jealous to a gross extreme. He will imag-
ine affairs and forbid any encounters not only with other men but
also friends, neighbours, relatives.
6. He has a Jeckyll and Hyde or a dual personality. He is capable
of being both vicious and loving.
7. He has a poor ability to deal with stress. Minor occurrences can
send him into an uncontrollable rage where he physically abuses
the woman.
8. He is totally unable to distinguish between aggression and sex.
Sexual contact is often forced and aggressive. It is a means of
expressing anger and hostility rather than affection.
9. He does not see his violent, abusive behaviour as wrong. He
does not believe there should be any averse consequences for his
behaviour. (Transcript of evidence 487-491).
Despite this list, she is the one with the syndrome. The sedimented histo-
ries produced by and through the Hardwicke Marriage Act and its domes-
tic fiction and legal analogues (anyone can understand a man wanting to
punish his wife .... a little rougher than usual handling ... and so on) goes
some way toward explaining the social production of such damaged mas-
culinities. These it seems to me are some of the sedimented histories that
might name his problem and show it to be a consequence of the kinds of
'imposing cultural scripts' Marcus wanted to identify in the rape script.
It seems to me that such huge stabilities, such imposing cultural scripts, are
227
exactly what Cameron and Frazer's The Lust to Kill (1987), Creed's The
Monstrous Feminine (1993) and Annstrong's subversive tale of the power
of the domestic woman are probably beginning to trace. Cameron and
Frazer argue that the culturally determined nature of sexual murder
emerges from its connections with cultural representations of sexuality and
gender. Murdering man's 'beastliness' is a specifically late nineteenth cen-
tury phenomenon. There have, they argue, to be reasons for this and they
find them in the potential for sex murder and sexual violence which they
claim has been embedded in Western society since the late eighteenth cen-
tury, the period of the initial perfonnative power of the Hardwicke
Marriage Act:
The eroticising of domination, cruelty and death is by no means
natural; it arose at a specific time in history. But it is also not con-
fined to a few abnonnal men: its imaginary forms are ubiquitous
in the West, ... In a culture which thus conflates sex, power and
death, ~he sexual killer (and the battering husband) is hardly an
exile. (Cameron and Frazer 1987: 68. Brackets and underlining
are mine)
Creed (1993) explores a small part of this apparatus for the production of
sexual selves in greater depth, looking at horror movies made by men. Her
primary thesis is that men fear women not, as Freud argued, because they
are castrated, but because they might castrate. Cataloguing images of
woman as monstrous feminine that are alive and well in the contemporary
horror film - witch, archaic mother, monstrous womb, vampire, femme cas-
tatrice, castrating mother - she argues that, horrific as they are, they pro-
vide understandings of the dark side of the patriarchal unconscious, the
pervading ambivalence towards the mother who nurtures but effects sepa-
rations. It is in these terms she suggests that horror films speak to the
unconscious fears of both the human subject (who fears pain, bodily disin-
tegration and death) and the gendered subject (male fears of women's
reproductive role and of castration, female fears of phallic aggressivity and
rape). In the course of this complex series of arguments Creed also criti-
cise.~ feminist theories of the spectator which, positioned by the dominant
Freudian story of the feminine as lack, never pennit the female viewer to
identify with aggressivity on the grounds that the female imaginary is
always non-violent.
There are then many sedimented histories potentially producing accounts
of women's represented and expected passivity. They are, if we can believe
the implications of Cameron and Frazer's discursive and of Creed's aes-
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thetic and psychoanalytical journey, part of a discursive fonnation/appara~
tus that begins in myth, legend and religion and continues its representa-
tions in the horror film, in art, pornography, poetry and popular and domes-
tic fiction and in traditional common-law legal categories. They give some
clues to the fears and fantasies that dominate the cultural imaginary and
that add to a beginning and rudimentary archaeology of the battering hus-
band. They also tell us that to imagine you can step outside the social imag-
inary and see the truth is a legal or a domestic fiction. There are only per-
fonnances, differently contextualised, perfonnatively responding to differ-
ent situations, provoked by different interactions within different institu-
tions, with different strategic agendas - all intertextually constituted in
deeply sedimented histories, histories that are corporeal and perforrnative,
histories that cannot be separated from fictions and bodies. 10
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